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 On a Wing and a Prayer? 
 Challenges for Reducing 
Armed Violence
Armed violence and political 
settlements
Armed violence can be described as the 
intentional, threatened or actual use of 
arms or explosives to inflict death or 
injury. It does not take place in a void 
but is institutionally and politically 
bounded, controlled and driven. Different 
types of violence such as conflict-related 
violence and criminal violence are inter-
linked and can reinforce each other, 
which makes them both practically and 
analytically difficult to disentangle. 
The concept of political settlements – 
referring to formal and informal 
processes of negotiation and bargaining 
between elite actors – can be applied 
to understand the relationships between 
different sets of political actors and 
their implications for reducing violence. 
In the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, a 
predatory and exclusionary political 
settlement centred on the appropriation 
of massive oil rents by relatively few 
federal (military) elites and major oil 
firms has fuelled violence and large-
scale criminal activity. The co-option of 
militant leaders into the country’s 
political settlement following the 
government’s amnesty in 2009 pacified 
the region to an extent. However, this 
expanded political settlement has not 
become more inclusive or democratic, 
and the threat of renewed violence 
looms large. 
In Nepal, violence has morphed since 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
was signed in 2006. Criminal violence 
in Kathmandu and a proliferating 
number of armed groups in the Terai 
region bordering India have exposed 
the failings of the country’s post-war 
political settlement, which has yet to 
address structural inequalities that 
fuelled the country’s Maoist insurgency 
to begin with.
The disadvantage and marginalisation 
of young people is significant to 
understanding why violence continues 
in many places. In Nairobi’s slums, a lack 
of economic opportunities has pushed 
young people into illegal activities and 
violent crime. They are routinely enlisted 
as foot soldiers for armed groups that 
oscillate between working as enforcers 
and mobilisers for politicians and 
operating as criminal outfits. 
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Most deaths due to violence now occur outside traditional conflict settings. 
In these contexts, violence is complex and often hard to understand, linked to 
a variety of conditions, situations and trends which are deeply embedded and 
difficult to shift without considerable investment, contextual knowledge and 
risk. Development is indispensible to reducing armed violence, while aid 
efforts are expected to be informed by rigorous evidence and qualify as good 
value for money. Therefore, defining and determining success in this field is 
urgently needed. This policy briefing explores the challenges of generating 
better evidence as well as how to respond to complexity, proposing where 
efforts should be focused.
“Different types 
of violence are 
often interlinked 
and can reinforce 
each other.”
Data debacles and evidence myths 
A lack of forensic data on armed violence in 
many contexts has confounded efforts to 
frame more effective responses. Rarely is 
data collected systematically in violent 
environments, which is unsurprising given that 
a great deal of violence happens at the margins, 
in the shadows and in places that are either 
beyond the reach of the state or where 
governments restrict access to information. As 
a result, approaches and techniques to address 
violence are rarely based on complete or even 
‘good enough’ data. This does not imply that 
understandings of violence are necessarily 
wrong. However, it does make it difficult to 
accurately target scarce resources when there 
may be only a general sense of what is 
happening.
Piecing together a more complete picture and 
understanding of violence requires compiling 
data from multiple sources: police forces, 
military and security services, courts, public 
health and other social service providers, 
financial institutions, religious institutions, 
illegal and/or criminal organisations, informal 
bodies and groups and, local leaders. Even 
where official data is available, its quality is often 
suspect. Moreover, poor data reflects politics 
and, specifically, an indifference to violence – if 
it is happening to people that those in power 
do not care about. Many incidents of violence 
are never reported (a problem that is more 
acute in peripheral or marginal areas). 
Monitoring armed violence is itself politically 
sensitive and authorities may stymie reporting 
efforts; in extreme cases reporting may also 
threaten the safety and security of some 
individuals and groups.
Reflecting an increased appetite for evidence-
based programming in the development sector 
more widely, policy guidance in the field of 
armed violence reduction now emphasises the 
need to invest in generating high quality data 
as well as rigorous monitoring and evaluation. 
This means establishing clear and achievable 
goals and targets, methodologies for quantifying 
results and appropriate indicators for assessing 
the impacts of interventions. Momentum is 
building to establish appropriate baselines 
against which armed violence reduction goals 
and targets can be evaluated, as well as find 
agreement between funders, governments, 
advocates, and violence-affected populations 
on what would be an appropriate timeframe 
for measuring when armed violence is 
successfully reduced. For example, a background 
paper for the 2010 Oslo Conference on Armed 
Violence proposed the following three goals 
for armed violence prevention and reduction 
activities: (1) reduce the number of people 
physically harmed from armed violence; (2) 
reduce the number of people and groups 
affected by armed violence; and (3) strengthen 
institutional responses to prevent and reduce 
armed violence. It also outlined a framework 
of eight targets and indicators to measure 
trends in armed violence and progress in its 
prevention and reduction. Efforts in this area 
continue.
Still, some criticise the turn to metrics and 
‘objective’ (measurable) data, as well as the 
related idea that policymaking is a largely 
technical exercise founded on ‘evidence’. An 
alternative view emphasises the political nature 
of the policy process, and the need to devise 
policies based on sound assumptions, clear 
indicators and the best available data of what 
works. This so-called ‘evidence debate’ raises 
questions around what constitutes ‘good’ data 
and whose knowledge counts. Its implications 
are quite fundamental for efforts to improve 
responses to armed violence. 
While the appeal of more robust evidence is 
unquestionable, and the need to assess the 
effectiveness of existing policies and measures 
in order to improve them is undeniable, typically 
what is sought is quantifiable data. Yet, given 
that quantitative data is patchy and unreliable 
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“Monitoring 
armed violence is 
itself politically 
sensitive and 
authorities may 
stymie reporting 
efforts…”
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“Truncated aid 
cycles and the 
pressure to show 
quick results can 
result in short-
term, projectised 
interventions that 
do little to shift 
the underlying 
drivers of violence.”
in many violence-affected places, stakeholders 
involved in addressing violence must identify 
alternative data sources as well as ways to 
verify, cross-reference and connect existing 
data from a variety of sources to generate 
better insights. Ultimately, neither quantitative 
nor qualitative data alone is sufficient. Rather, 
efforts to build ‘evidence’ on situations of 
violence require more effective ways of 
triangulating different evidence types, as well 
as analytical approaches to interpret and 
understand variables and contexts that are 
more difficult to measure or test using 
conventional survey instruments. 
Strengthening responses to address 
the underlying drivers of violence 
It is widely recognised that violence is multi-
variant, multi-causal and driven by shifting 
motivations and, thus, that a contextual analysis 
and approach is vital. However, there is much 
less certainty about how to do this. 
Development policy in the field of armed 
violence reduction emphasises the need for a 
comprehensive analysis of violence as well as 
responses to address the problem. Responses 
must be multidisciplinary, multisectoral and 
implemented at multiple levels, and promote 
genuine local leadership. Integrated and 
whole-of-government approaches are also 
advocated bringing together justice, policing, 
development and conflict-resolution expertise. 
However, making this happen in practice is far 
from certain. Researchers and technical experts 
often focus on coordination challenges and the 
need to improve coherence amongst multiple 
existing efforts by governments, militaries, 
police, communities and aid partners. 
Sometimes they advocate a greater use of 
pooled funds and integration of violence 
reduction measures in budgets. Sometimes 
there is a renewed emphasis on partnerships 
between state authorities, civil society and the 
private sector to join up complementary efforts 
and competencies. 
The mantra of improved coordination and 
partnership does not necessarily address the 
more fundamental conundrum of how to act 
effectively as part of a longer-term and dynamic 
process of moving out of violence. The very 
emphasis on the need for a ‘comprehensive 
approach’ itself suggests that reducing violence 
will necessarily be part of a broader 
transformation in economy, polity and society 
– something that is shown by a political 
settlements analysis. Yet, truncated aid cycles 
and the pressure to show quick results can 
result in short-term, projectised interventions 
that do little to shift the underlying drivers of 
violence. Reducing violence is a long-term goal, 
and results are not guaranteed.
Naturally, given the complex framing and 
underlying factors driving and perpetuating 
particular situations of armed violence, it is 
widely recognised that local ownership and 
leadership are indispensible to effectively 
address these, as well. 
Part of the problem is the increasing tendency 
by aid actors to avoid taking risks. Stringent 
legal and regulatory requirements for due 
diligence by donors and their partners impede 
efforts to work with individuals, organisations 
and groups that are often all too quickly 
associated with terrorism, crime and related 
violence. A more proportional and cooperative 
perspective is needed that both reverses the 
presumption of potential wrong-doing by 
non-state organisations and groups working 
to reduce violence, and acknowledges the 
positive contribution they can make in 
addressing conditions that lead to and 
perpetuate violence. Funding bodies also need 
to take more calculated risks and pool these 
with other actors. This would minimise 
potential political consequences at home but 
should not weaken accountability to populations 
living with violence who must be more centrally 
involved in defining good practice in this 
emergent field.
Policy recommendations
Reducing armed violence through development is arguably an outsize ambition, 
an impossible aim that dwarves the capacities of most conventional development 
actors to make a significant difference. Yet, improving physical safety and security 
rank amongst the most important ways in which peoples’ lives could be improved 
in many areas outside of traditional conflict settings. Although there is widening 
acceptance of the need for a comprehensive approach and a central role for 
development to reduce armed violence, a key challenge now is to move from 
rather generic policy guidance to more concrete action that can make this happen.
Striking the balance between quantifiable measurement and sound qualitative insight
One challenge is generating better insights into the causes and factors 
perpetuating armed violence in different places as well as ways to assess the 
impacts of efforts to address the problem. While the need to formulate 
achievable goals, targets, and indicators in the field of armed violence reduction is 
obvious, the glorification of quantifiable (measurable) data unhelpfully marginalises 
entire fields of knowledge that are essential to understand and address situations 
of violence. Qualitative and ethnographic approaches that emphasise critical 
reflection and explanatory insight are equally needed alongside the use of 
measurable data drawn from standard survey-type instruments.
Adapting aid approaches and modalities to handle complexity 
A second challenge in this field is how to respond to a problem that is inherently 
complex, connected to a variety of conditions, trends and pressures that cut across 
discrete areas of policymaking, planning and budgeting. Aid apparatuses are poorly 
equipped to work with such complexity. More joined-up efforts and better 
partnerships are essential. This briefing identifies the need for more thinking and 
development of funding approaches that enable interventions beyond truncated 
project cycles.
Strengthening local capacities for addressing violence
A third challenge is to formulate different approaches to support local capacities 
for reducing and preventing armed violence. Very practical legal and regulatory 
obstacles impede the development of different models for working with local 
stakeholders in violent environments. A more cooperative perspective is essential 
within prevailing counter-terrorism and anti-money laundering frameworks, as are 
ways of pooling risk that open up the possibility for more innovative arrangements 
in supporting local stakeholders.
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